Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2021

Bigotry, Prophecy, Religion, and the Race Analogy in Marriage and
Civil Rights Battles: Responding to Commentaries on Who's the
Bigot?
Linda C. McClain

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

Journal of Law and Religion 36, no. 2 (2021): 358–369 © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on
behalf of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University
doi:10.1017/jlr.2021.48

BOOK REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

bigotry, prophecy, religion, and the
race analogy in marriage and civil
rights battles: responding to
commentaries on who’s the bigot?
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One of the most rewarding parts of writing a book is that it opens the door for constructive conversation with thoughtful and perceptive readers like the scholars who generously contributed to
this book symposium. Their various essays touch on and offer powerful insights about the core concerns that I had when I wrote Who’s the Bigot? Learning from Conicts over Marriage and Civil
Rights Law. They offer thoughtful empirical and normative observations and surface useful questions about important future investigations. Were I able to write a next chapter—or a sequel—all
these commentaries would shape its content. As it is, I have beneted from engaging with these
commentaries and will wrestle with some of the challenges they pose in my future work. In
response, I briey addresses some of the cross-cutting themes in the commentaries by putting
some of the commentaries in conversation with each other, and I attempt to answer some of the
constructive criticism that they offer.

some animating concerns of who’s the bigot?
When I began writing Who’s the Bigot?, my immediate motive was trying to analyze the provocative use of the rhetoric of bigotry in dissenting opinions in Supreme Court jurisprudence about
civil marriage equality, and, in particular, charges that lawmakers and voters who opposed samesex marrige because of their religious beliefs were being branded as bigots. As the contributors to
this book symposium discuss, analogies about race and racism were and remain at the heart of these
charges, raising this question: Is it instructive, as a matter of constitutional interpretation of due
pocess liberty or equal protection, to compare racially discriminatory marriage laws to laws restricting marriage to one man and one woman (or, traditional marriage), or is such a comparison treating today’s sincere religoius believers in traditional marriage as the moral equivalent of yesteryear’s
odious, racist bigots? Similar questions percolate when such believers are business owners who seek
exemptions from state public accommodation laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity or based on traditional categories like race, color, national origin,
and sex. Is it constitutionally instructive to recall unsuccessful First Amendment claims that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 burdened a business owner’s sincere religious belief in racial segregation?
358
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Or, once again, is the race analogy so provocative—and morally distinct—as to amount to branding present day exemption seekers as bigots?
In Who’s the Bigot?, I examine how, in these present-day controversies over religious objections
to same-sex marriage (or civil marriage equality) and LGBTQ equality, objections to the race analogy frequently invoke both “conscience” and sincerity to rebut charges of bigory, as though religious racism was insincere, pretextual, and hypocritical. Additionally, sometimes the objections
turn on the unreasonableness and odiousness of racism, in contrast to the reasonableness of decent
and honorable beliefs about marriage as exclusively a one man-one woman union—or about sex or
gender identity as male or female as a divine and immutable gift at birth. These types of arguments
invite a focus on the denition(s) of bigotry and the critical role of time in assessing bigotry, or what
I describe as bigotry’s backward-looking and forward-looking dimensions.
In Who’s the Bigot?, I show that, as a denitional matter, the premise that a belief that is sincere
or derived from conscience could never be bigoted was incorrect. I further illustrate how people
appealed to conscience and religious faith both to indict bigotry (such as white supremacy and segregation) and to defend racial discrimination and to rebut charges of bigotry (as in the theology of
segregation or charges that the supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were the “real” bigots)
(76–126). I also examine how notions of what is “reasonable” and “unreasonable” are contested
and change over time, illustrating with the competing appeals to science and reason in the theology
of integration and the (now-repudiated) theology of segregation. The contributors to this
symposium fruitfully engage with these dimensions of Who’s the Bigot?
Finally, another spur to writing Who’s the Bigot? was a perception that charges, denials, and
countercharges of bigotry were increasingly frequent in the United States, especially with the 2016
election and the growing political polarization during the presidency of Donald J. Trump. In that
context, race and racism were also central: Were public ofcials encouraging or endorsing bigotry,
rather than condemning it, with the result of emboldening white supremacy that many Americans
thought was among the clearly repudiated forms of bigotry? I ask, “[w]hy is there so much controversy over bigotry when renouncing—and denouncing—it seems to be a shared political value with a
long history?” (4). I argue that the temporal dimension of bigotry offerd some clues, as the frequently
voiced concern about being on the “right” rather than “wrong” side of history illustrates.
A further aim was to help clarify and justify vital constitutional and legislative steps over the last
several decades toward repudiating discrimination and unequal citizenship and realizing commitments to liberty and equality. I argue that drawing analogies between past and present struggles
could support those developments, rather than be inevitably explosive.
I am grateful that the contributors to this symposium believe that Who’s the Bigot? sheds
some light on the rhetoric—and the problem—of bigotry and what I called “puzzles about bigotry”
(6–14). It is an honor that Henry L. Chambers, Jr. writes that “[a]nyone who cares about
discrimination would prot from reading this book,”1 and that Kyle Velte comments that
“McClain’s book is essential reading for LGBT rights advocates” and that I present a “compelling
picture of a through-line of the rhetoric of bigotry from the 1950s to the present day.”2 It is gratifying that theologian and legal scholar M. Cathleen Kaveny believes that my book aids in understanding some of the conceptual problems with framings of contemporary legal controversies that
“pit the religious freedom of devout Christians against the rights of LGBTQ Americans to be
1
2

Henry L. Chambers, Jr., “Who’s the Bigot? The Book Matters but the Question Does Not,” Journal of Law and
Religion 36, no. 2 (2021) (this issue).
Kyle C. Velte, “Lessons for LGBT Rights Advocates from Who’s the Bigot,” Journal of Law and Religion 36, no. 2
(2021) (this issue).
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treated with dignity and equality in the public square.”3 As Robin Fretwell Wilson, Aylin Cakan,
and Marie-Joe Noon observe in their commentary, what rules will govern the public square are at
the center of a number of “culture war ghts” that seem “existential,” implicating “our deepest
commitments and identities;” as they observe, in these struggles, “charges”—and countercharges
—of “discrimination and bigotry” issue.4 I am gratied that they believe Who’s the Bigot? illuminates “the role that the label bigot has played in fracturing an already fractured society.”5 I now
take up some of the cross-cutting themes in the six commentaries.

bigotry, prophecy, and hypocrisy
Kaveny, Chambers, and Justin Buckley Dyer each raise intriguing issues about how to dene
“bigot” and “bigotry.” Kaveny argues that the term “bigot” “currently functions as a term of prophetic indictment, a charge that someone is not acting in accordance with the basic moral-legal
charter of our polity.”6 Further, such “prophetic indictment”—the “jeremiad”—is an important
part of American moral discourse.”7 This is an illuminating observation because it captures the
moral power and sense of urgency at work when someone denounces bigotry—or criticizes
othes for failing to do so. Kaveny also points out that prophetic indictment—in the biblical tradition—not only castigates people for their sins but also calls “for repentance and reform.”8 In Who’s
the Bigot?, I higlight language from civil rights-era sermons in which religious leaders both condemed racial prejudice as unscriptural and sinful and also spoke of the need to rouse the conscience
of, and redeem the segregator, rescue them from the “poisonous fangs” of “racial customs and traditions that have grown up out of the hotbed of ignorance and prejudice” (92).9 As Kaveny
observes, however, when faced with a prophetic indictment, the more typical response is to “indignantly deny the charge, often reversing it,” rather than to “humbly admit guilt, repent, and promise
to reform.”10
Kaveny attributes the explosiveness of a charge of bigotry to two different denitions of bigotry:
having “bad motive” (as in the historical denition of bigot as a “religious hypocrite” or too committed to the tenets of faith) or “bad reasons” (as in the bigot as being “obstinately or intolerantly
devoted” to one’s opinions and prejudices, and in treating members of a “racial or ethnic group”

M. Cathleen Kaveny, “Reason, Feeling, Religion, and Bigotry,” Journal of Law and Religion 36, no. 2 (2021) (this
issue).
4 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Aylin Cakan, and Marie-Joe Noon, “From Bigotry to Tolerance,” Journal of Law and
Religion 36, no. 2 (2021) (this issue).
5 Wilson, Cakan, and Noon, “From Bigotry to Tolerance.”
6 Kaveny, “Reason, Feeling, Religion, and Bigotry.”
7 Kaveny.
8 Kaveny.
9 Quoting Charles Kenzie Steele, “The Tallahassee Bus Protest Story,” in Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 1954–1965, ed. Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon, 2 vols. (Waco: Baylor University Press,
2006–2014), 2:73–79, at 77. In Who’s the Bigot?, I also discuss how both Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and his
teacher, Dr. Benjamin Mays, stressed that segregation “scars the soul of both the segregator and the segregated”
(92–93, quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., “Stride toward Freedom,” in A Testament of Hope: The Essential
Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James Melvin Washington [New York: Harper One,
1986], 417–90, at 478; cf. Benjamin E. Mays, “The Church Amidst Ethnic and Racial Tensions,” in Houck and
Dixon, Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights Movement, 1956–1965, 1:55–64, at 62).
10 Kaveny, “Reason, Feeling, Religion, and Bigotry.”
3
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with “hatred and intolerance”).11 Considering these denitions, a charge of bigotry puts the recipient in a place that is “not comfortable”: “the charge means that the target’s reasons for acting are
so awed that they are either intellectually obtuse or could not possibly be acting in good faith.”12
Kaveny insightfully connects this denitional dilemma to a cogent critique of the state of First
Amendment jurisprudence, where the issue is the sincerity of litigants’ religious claims, not the
rationality of those claims. Indeed, courts are not to assess such rationality. This leads to an equation of sincerity with “depth and intensity of personal feeling, rather than coherence of intellectual
and moral judgment.”13 I will not take up the jurisprudential point here, but I commend to readers
Kaveny’s thoughtful argument about the broader societal implications of this emphasis on sincerity
—it risks reducing sincerity merely to feeling, in contrast to religoius traditions that urge believers to
examine “emerging ethical questions in light of the insights of scripture, tradition, and reason, as
well as experience.”14
Kaveny’s essay dovetails well with that of Wilson, Cakan, and Noon, who point to the limits of
courts in facilitating this kind of critical examination in order to facilitate a shift, as they call it in
the title of their essay, “from bigotry to tolerance.”15 While Kaveny argues that First Amendment
jurisprudence leads religious believers making claims of religious liberty to think those claims
“should be insulated from scrutiny from their fellow citizens and fellow believers,”16 Wilson,
Cakan, and Noon argue that there is a vital space, outside of courts, in which people with divergent
religious beliefs can move toward peaceful coexistence and tolerance through dialogue and a “culture of engagement built on mutual respect.”17 They offer an encouraging example of a young person from a “small, religious town,” inculcated in the view that “legalizing gay marriage was a
threat to my religious beliefs,” coming to reject that view and instead wanting to be an “ally”
after observing a family of two dads and their “young son.”18 This example also suggests the
power of social contact with members of a minority or group that is discriminated against (as I discuss in Who’s the Bigot?) to change negative views of the group—a step toward tolerance (30–33,
45–46). With respect to institutional conicts, such as the terms on which religious social service
agencies contract with government, as raised in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,19 Wilson, Cakan,
and Noon argue that, by contrast to the “zero-sum” framings that pit rights against each other
in constitutional litigation, the legislative and executive branches of government have the potential
to nd “creative” approaches that work for “common ground positions.”20 Wilson has long
labored for this kind of common ground, and I applaud her continuing efforts. However, as is
often the case, the proverbial devil is in the details; as I examine in Who’s the Bigot?, there are
sharply conicting views about the terms on which “peaceful coexistence” is possible (181–94).

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20

Kaveny, quoting Merriam-Webster, s.v. “bigot (n.),” accessed July 13, 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/bigot.
Kaveny.
Kaveny.
Kaveny.
Wilson, Cakan, and Noon, “From Bigotry to Tolerance.”
Kaveny, “Reason, Feeling, Religion, and Bigotry.”
Wilson, Cakan, and Noon, “From Bigotry to Tolerance.”
Wilson, Cakan, and Noon, quoting Cicily Bennion, “#ToleranceMeans That You’ve Taken the First Step towards
Loving Someone Different from You,” Tolerance Means Dialogues, June 17, 2019, https://www.tolerancemeans.
com/essaylist/2019/6/17/cicily-bennion-graduate-brigham-young-university.
Fulton et al. v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
Wilson, Cakan, and Noon, “From Bigotry to Tolerance.”
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Like Kaveny, Chambers also discusses the relationship among religious sincerity, hypocrisy, and
bigotry. Picking up on my denitional point that sincere religious belief can be bigoted, Chambers
argues that I should have investigated further the difference between sincere religious belief and
“mere preferences based on supposed religoius docrine” and that I should also have centered the
role of “hypocrisy” in my analysis.21 One should ask, he argues, “whether people who claim religious belief as the basis for their discriminatory views sincerely believe that their religion requires
those views as opposed to merely preferring an interpretation of religious doctrine that leads to
those views or wishing society would be organized around their desire that may be supported
by, but not required by, religious orthodoxy.”22 This is a helpful point. As Chambers notes, I
do observe that some religious leaders have explored these distinctions. For example, I quote sermons in the decade after the Brown v. Board of Education era that appealed to “conscience” to
help teach white churchgoers that they must live by Christian conviction and conscience, “rather
than by preference and by prejudice”—including prejudice about interracial marriage (91–92, quotation at 92).23 Similar sermons noted the thinking of “many Christians in our [white] churches,”
who “know what is right”—and “Christian”—“but prefer to follow our prejudices” and oppose
desegregation (91).24
Such examples do suggest a hypocrisy and perceived self-interest in relying on religious belief to
justify opposition to racial justice. Even so, some segregationist ministers expressed their conviction
that segregation was God’s will and required by scripture with a strong sense of condence and
moral certitude, giving religious legitmacy to efforts to maintain segregation (98). As Velte
observes, while “most Americans look back at that historical moment and cringe at what we
now see as overt racism,” it does not change “the historical fact” that reliance on conscience
and faith to defend segregation was “considered sincere and mainstream” and, by some, “even virtuous”(80–81).25
In highlighting how Who’s the Bigot? could have brought a sharper focus to hypocrisy,
Chambers offers the constructive criticism that my analysis of Loving v. Virginia would have
been strenghtened by grapping with “the existence of interracial relationships and children of
such relationships prior” to Loving, including children of white men and enslaved Black women,
most famously, Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemmings.26 Chambers aptly observes that “[v]arious
prominent Virginians seemed unconcerned with relationships involving dubious consent that produced mixed-race children, but they deemed fully consensual marriage that did so to be problematic,” suggesting that this reveals the hypocrisy and bigotry of Virginia’s arguments in Loving that
centered around barring interracial marriage for the sake of the children such unions might produce.27 While Virginia’s child-centered arguments in Loving purported to be more rooted in social
science than in theology (by contrast to the trial judge’s appeal to divine separation of the races),
Chambers has a point about hypocrisy. I do recount that, in their brief, the Lovings pointed to the
long history of white men’s sexual exploitation of Black women in the south while being xated on
the “purity of white womanhood” and described the white man’s “‘sore conscience’ under the
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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Chambers, “Who’s the Bigot? The Book Matters but the Question Does Not.”
Chambers.
Quoting Haywood N. Hill, “This I Believe,” in Houck and Dixon, Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 1:405–07, at 406 (emphasis added in Who’s the Bigot?).
Quoting Charles P. Bowles, “A Cool Head and a Warm Heart (Luke 10:25–37),” in Houck and Dixon, Rhetoric,
Religion, and the Civil Rights Movement, 1:31–36, at 34.
Velte, “Lessons for LGBT Rights Advocates from Who’s the Bigot.”
Chambers, “Who’s the Bigot? The Book Matters but the Question Does Not.”
Chambers.
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‘illicit conditions fostered by the miscegenation laws’” (136).28 I also report W. E. B. DuBois’s
retort to the “‘cry’ of ‘Southern Gentlemen’ to ‘[d]eliver us from the vision of intermarriage’.”
“[L]egal marriage,” DuBois wrote, “is innitely better than systemic concubinage and prostitution.” He went on to lodge an implicit indictment of their hypocrisy in observing: “The wrong
which you gentleman have done against helpless black women in deance of your own laws is written on the foreheads of two millions of mulattoes, and written in ineffaceable blood” (85–86).29

the crucial role of time in assessing bigotry
Several of the commentators engage with my attention in Who’s the Bigot? to the role of time in
assessing bigotry. For example, Jonathan Kahn agrees with me that “attention to the temporal
aspect of bigotry is critical.”30 Kahn picks up on my discussion of Justice Kennedy’s observation,
in his “gay rights” jurisprudence—“the nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our
time” (17)31—to assert, “[i]dentifying racism in real time is, indeed, the challenge of the moment.
Nobody ever thinks they are a bigot.”32
To the various examples I offer in Who’s the Bigot?, Kahn supplies still more instances of the
appeal to morality, religion, law, and conscience to justify racism and racial segregation.
Tellingly, in a 1957 statement by white homeowners in Levittown, Pennsylvania, about why
they opposed integration and race “mixing,” the homeowners praise themselves as “moral, religious, and law-abiding,” and claim their desire for a “closed community” is not an act of prejudice
or discrimination; instead, they assert a separate but equal notion of “equal rights”: “Negroes”
have “equal opportunity to build” their own community without “intermingling” with their
white one.33 In Who’s the Bigot? I quote similar denials of bigotry and prejudice in statements
by white businessmen and politicians against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as they argued the better
way was not forced integration and intermingling, but parallel, equal institutions and communities
(118–20). These speakers, in other words, did not (evidently) see injustice and racism in these conceptions of equal opportunity that justied racial segregation. Or, as Chambers might argue, their
interpretation of what religion and morality required was either pretextual or shaped by a selfinterest in maintaining the unequal status quo.
In his commentary, Justin Dyer raises concerns about my focus on the “element of time” (213)
and my emphasis on “evolving understandings of justice” (for example, the role, in constitutional
interpretation, of “new insights” in revealing injustice [150]).34 As I undersand this critique, it is
because I show how appeals to “reason, nature, religious authority,” and “transcendent moral principle” have been used to oppose civil rights that I discount such arguments.35 Dyer asks, if there are
not “unchanging moral principles,” and “reason and justice” emerge “only after a societal

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Quoting Brief for Appellants at 24–25, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) (internal citations
omitted).
Quoting W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903; repr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 81.
Kahn, “Seeing Racism in Real Time,” Journal of Law and Religion 36, no. 2 (2021) (this issue).
Quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).
Kahn, “Seeing Racism in Real Time.”
Kahn, quoting David Kushner, Levittown: Two Families, One Tycoon, and the Fight for Civil Rights in America’s
Legendary Suburb (New York: Walker, 2009), 112.
Justin Buckley Dyer, “Bigotry, Time, and Moral Progress,” Journal of Law and Religion 36, no. 2 (2021) (this
issue).
Dyer, “Bigotry, Time, and Moral Progress.”
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consensus,” then what standard, other than “convention,” guides reform?36 Dyer nds an “implicit
underlying moral anthropology” in which “reason does not provide insight into any transhistorical
truths” or help us discover “those moral prinicples we collectively afrm.”37 My focus, in Who’s
the Bigot?, on time and on “generational moral progress” in realizing the Constitution’s guarantees
of liberty and equality was not to embrace a sort of moral relativism or render suspect or useless
any appeal to “reason” or to “reasonableness” as a criterion in controversies over equality and justice (128–29). I do not think Dyer and I disagree that, historically, parties have appealed to “reason” to justify opposition to civil rights. We may disagree on what the implications of those earlier
controversies are for present-day controversies over civil rights. I believe reasoning and deliberation
are critical in these political controveries and in constitutional interpretation. Dyer and I may disagree over methods of constitutional interpretation, such as the critical role of evolving understandings of justice and of the broad constitutional commitments to liberty and equality. But I agree with
him that recognizing the temporal dimension of understandings of bigotry, injustice, and reasonableness raises questions and challenges.
One such question is: What allows people to see injustice in “real time”? Kahn powerfully
argues that the horrifying video of Derek Chauvin “staring brazenly, enduringly, and persistently
into the lens of the camera” while kneeling on the neck of George Floyd had the effect that some
white people became able to “see” the injustice that they had not seen in “the myriad other horric
videos we have been confronted with over the past decade”: Chauvin’s “gaze of complicity” invited
white persons watching the video to become complicit in his murderous act, unless they were willing to confront racism “in real time.”38 The multiracial protests for racial justice and showing of
support for #BlackLivesMatter after the murder of Floyd were one way that white persons rejected
that invitation to complicity.
Kahn and I agree that identifying injustice in our time is “especially hard if one dismisses history
as irrelevant,” since “seeing and perception” are critical to understanding this history, raising the
question: “What are we able to see in our own time and how do we respond to it?”39
Velte echoes my observation that the United States “is a nation steeped in historical amnesia that
has led to a collective forgetting” about its long history of race discrimination; she notes her law
students’ “historical knowledge gaps” about prior civil rights struggles.40 Defending the use of
the analogy to race discrimination in advocacy for LGBT rights, and illustrating how Who’s the
Bigot? can aid in drawing that analogy, Velte persuasively argues that “our collective forgetting”
about how religiously based arguments were made on both sides of struggles over desegregation,
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and bans on interracial marriage makes it difcult to
explain the analogy without reductive rejoinders that one is labeling today’s sincere religious believers as the moral equivalent of religious racists.41 Common moves, as she notes, are either to question the sincerity of religious defenders of racial segregation or to contend that these were fringe,
rather than widely held, positions.

36
37
38
39
40

41
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Dyer.
Dyer.
Kahn, “Seeing Racism in Real Time.”
Kahn.
Velte, “Lessons for LGBT Rights Advocates from Who’s the Bigot?” In Who’s the Bigot?, I offer historian Peggy
Pascoe’s comment that shortly after Loving v. Virginia, there was a national “forgetting” of the
“three-century-long history of bans on interracial marriage” (139, quoting Peggy Pascoe, What Comes
Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America [New York: Oxford University Press,
2009], 292).
Velte, “Lessons for LGBT Rights Advocates from Who’s the Bigot?”
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I nd intriguing Velte’s proposed approach of seeking to present to judges the “facts of religious
objections to civil rights” as a “factual comparison” rather than a “normative comparison between
opponents of racial equality and today’s exemption seekers.”42 Of course, whether an “explicitly
factual, normatively neutral approach” is desirable, even if it is feasible, is one question. In
Who’s the Bigot?, I offer some examples of lower federal court opinions striking down state
“defense of marriage” laws in which judges seemed to take this approach. Judge Robert Hinkle
of the Northern District of Florida, for example, observed that religious arguments for miscegenation laws seem, “nearly 50 years later,” an “obvious pretext for racism,” making it “hard for those
who were not then of age to understand just how sincerely those views were held.” “50 years from
now,” Judge Hinkle continues, observers would have a similar difculty, wondering “just how
those views could have been held” (127).43 At the same time, one lesson I drew from my own excavation of Supreme Court jurisprudence was that judges and justices hear charges of bigotry whenever another jurist draws a parallel between earlier, race-based restrictions and present-day sexual
orientation-based restrictions, even when no language of bigotry is used (170–210).
Consider Justice Alito’s frequently quoted dissent in Obergefell, in which he predicted that even
to draw an analogy between race and sex discrimination in marriage and the restrictions at issue
(limiting marriage to one man and one woman) would lead to traditional believers being branded
as bigots.44 More recently, his Federalist Society speech reiterated his objection to Obergefell and
the predictions in his Obergefell dissent about its impact on religious liberty. He asserted: “you
can’t say that marriage is the union between one man and one woman. Until very recently,
that’s what the vast majority of Americans thought. Now it’s considered bigotry.”45
Justice Thomas also continues to enlist the rhetoric of bigotry in voicing his continuing dissent
from Obergefell. Thus, when the Supreme Court denied Kentucky clerk Kim Davis’s petition for a
writ of certiorari in Ermold v. Davis46—after the Sixth Circuit denied rehearing on her claim of qualied immunity in a lawsuit brought by same-sex couples for damages due to Davis’s refusal to issue
marriage licenses—Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Alito) concurred in the denial because it did not
“cleanly present” important issues about Obergefell.47 However, he strongly stated his continuing
criticism of Obergefell for failing to protect religious liberty: “Davis may have been one of the
rst victims of this Court’s cavalier treatment of religion in its Obergefell decision, but she will
not be its last.”48 He contended that Obergefell “enables courts and governments to brand religious
adherents who believe that marriage is between one man and one woman as bigots, making their
religious liberty concerns that much easier to dismiss.” Thus, “[d]ue to Obergefell, those with sincerely held religious beliefs concerning marriage will nd it increasingly difcult to participate in society without running afoul of Obergefell and its effect on other antidiscrimination laws.”49
As I observed in Who’s the Bigot?, even as these conservative justices criticize Obergefell for
allowing government to brand believers as bigots, they also appeal to Obergefell’s “promise”
that such “sincere” believers will continue to be able to exercise their First Amendment rights.
42
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Velte (emphasis Velte’s).
Quoting Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 741–42 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Josh Blackman, “Video and Transcript of Justice Alito’s’ Keynote Address to the Federalist Society,” Volokh
Conspiracy, Reason, November 12, 2020, https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/12/video-and-transcript-of-justicealitos-keynote-address-to-the-federalist-society/.
936 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020).
Davis, 141 S. Ct. at 4.
Davis, 141 S. Ct. at 3.
Davis, 141 S. Ct. at 3–4.
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Kennedy’s language about “decent” and “honorable” premises for those beliefs has supported
arguments by conservative justices and religious opponents of civil marriage equality that their
beliefs are not tantamount to religious racism. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop provided further support for these kinds of distinctions.
Although Kennedy never referred explicitly to bigotry or claimed Jack Phillips was being
branded as a bigot, he did chastise the Colorado civil rights commissioner for showing “hostility”
toward Phillips by comparing his religious beliefs about marriage to religious defenses of slavery
and the Holocaust. At the same time, his opinion drew on the race analogy: Kennedy enlisted
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, a precedent that upheld the Civil Rights Act against an objection rooted in religious opposition to racial integration, to explain, as I point out in Who’s the
Bigot?, that while “religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage” were protected
views, there is a “general rule” that business owners holding those views may not “deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services” under public accommodations law (206).50 Thus,
Masterpiece Cakeshop offered something for everyone: it conrmed the relevance of civil rights-era
precedents to current battles over antidiscrimination law while also indicating that there was a
moral distance between Phillips and religious racists.
Even so, the invocation of Piggie Park highlights that the decency or indecency of a religious
belief is not the point for considering whether government must provide an exemption. As Velte
and Kaveny point out, First Amendment jurisprudence insists only that beliefs be “sincere,” not reasonable or decent. From this, Velte draws the important observation that it may be possible to
instruct judges about factual analogies to race without making a normative judgment (such as bigoted then/bigoted now).
Fulton did not prove to be the case in which to test Velte’s proposal. Certainly, there was keen
interest in the race analogy at oral argument. Several justices drew analogies to religiously motivated race discrimination, asking questions like: “What if a religiously motivated social service provider didn’t want to certify as foster parents an interracial couple?”51 Through such questions, the
justices sought to determine what line Catholic Social Services wanted them to draw concerning
when the government has to let contractors follow their religious beliefs and when it can decline
because of compelling governmental interests in equal treatment and nondiscrimination. For example, is race the only area in which the government’s interest in prohibiting discrimination is so compelling (that is, “super-compelling,” a term used at oral argument) that, even if a service provider
has religious beliefs against interracial marriage, government could readily deny an exemption? Or,
as the City argued, is prohibiting sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination also
compelling because of (as Justice Sotomayor put it) the stigma created by rejection?
Chief Justice Roberts’s narrowly reasoned opinion in Fulton did not engage the race analogy.
Roberts focused on the fact that a clause in the City’s contract, which states that government contractors like Catholic Social Services shall not reject a prospective foster parent or child based on “sexual
orientation,” also allows for an exception granted in the “sole discretion” of the commissioner.52
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Quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
Linda C. McClain, “Religious Liberty Exemptions for Government Contractors,” interview by Kimberly
Miragliuolo, The Record, July 1, 2021, https://www.bu.edu/law/record/articles/2021/religious-liberty-for-government-contractors/. See also Linda C. McClain, “The Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Oral Argument: Interracial
Marriage as a Constitutional Lodestar—Or Third Rail?—in Reasoning about Religiously-Motivated
Discrimination,” Balkinization (blog), November 17, 2020, https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-fulton-vcity-of-philadelphia-oral.html.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (2021).
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Citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and other First Amendment cases,
Roberts reasoned that the contract is not “generally applicable”; as a result, the city could not refuse
to allow an exemption to Catholic Social Services without a “compelling reason.”53 It is encouraging
that, in granting the City’s “weighty” interest in “equal treatment of prospective foster parents and
foster children,” Roberts quotes Justice Kennedy’s words from Masterpiece Cakeshop: “[o]ur society
has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as
inferior in dignity and worth.”54 However, Roberts concludes: “On the facts of this case, however,
this interest cannot justify denying C[atholic] S[ocial] S[ervices] an exception for its religious exercise,”
because the contract allows exceptions and the City offered “no compelling reason” for denying
Catholic Social Services an exception.55 Roberts noted that the City contracts with many other foster
care agencies willing to certify gay couples and that Catholic Social Services is willing to refer gay couples to them. Roberts avoided deciding whether the city treated the agency’s religion with “hostility,”
as it had argued (invoking Masterpiece Cakeshop).56
The race analogy was not entirely absent in Fulton, however. In a concurring opinion joined
by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, Justice Alito drew on the analogy in a way that shows how
some view any comparison to religiously based race discrimination reads as a charge of presentday bigotry. Alito writes: “Suppressing speech—or religious practice—simply because it
expresses an idea that some nd hurtful is a zero-sum game. While C[atholic] S[ocial] S[ervice]’s
ideas about marriage are likely to be objectionable to same-sex couples, lumping those who hold
traditional beliefs about marriage together with racial bigots is insulting to those who retain such
beliefs.”57 Alito quotes both from Obergefell’s majority opinion and its “promise” to religions
and their adherents and from Masterpiece Cakeshop to insist that “traditional beliefs about marriage” are “decent and honorable” and should not be equated with “racism, which is neither.”58
This concurring opinion suggests that, for at least three justices, the race analogy still sounds as a
charge of bigotry.

why talk about implicit bias when there is so much overt
bigotry and racism?
Chambers and Kahn both focus on the attention I give to a shift in the scientic study of prejudice
from overt bigotry and prejudice to implicit or unconscious bias. Chambers comments that Who’s
the Bigot? focuses primarily on “bigotry and explicit bias,” but makes a “brief detour into unconscious bias”; he speculates that “the potential restorm over calling people bigots or views bigoted”
may have led me to “consider whether unconscious bias may have replaced bigotry in the discrimination hierarchy.”59 Kahn aptly observes how problematic it is when implicit bias is elevated “into
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a sort of master narrative for talking about issues of racial justice.”60 I completely agree that racism,
not implicit bias, was the problem when the manager of a Philadelphia Starbucks, after questioning
two Black men who sat down without ordering and being informed that they would wait to order
until a third person arrived, called the police and had them arrested.61
I agree with Chambers and Kahn that a discussion of implicit bias should not divert attention
to the continuing problems of both overt racism and structural, or systemic, racism. In my book,
I identify some tensions within classic works such as W. Gordon Allport’s 1954 The Nature of
Prejudice,62 and I also examine the shift in the scientic understanding of prejudice to focus less
on self-reported prejudice to tools like the Implicit Association Test to highlight unconscious
bias at odds with (voiced) egalitarian commitments (for example, “the hidden biases of good
or good-ish people”) (44). I did this not to suggest either that overt and structural racism—
and other forms of discrimination—were irrelevant to understanding battles over bigotry, but
to oat a tension between viewing “the bigot” as a xed, irredeemable personality type and
viewing prejudice as arising out of ordinary cognitive processes. Events since I nished writing
Who’s the Bigot?, including the police killings of George Floyd and other Black and Brown
Americans that spurred a summer of protests, show the urgent need to address overt and structural/systemic racism. Tellingly, in the Trump administration’s rhetoric about these protests,
demands to address systemic racism were met with a claim that the problem was simply a few
“bad apples.” As I elaborate elsewhere, Trump and some of his supporters turned the diagnosis
of systemic racism and demand for reform into a charge that good, decent, ordinary Americans
were being branded as bigots.63 This suggests the continuing potency of the rhetoric of bigotry
when used to deect attention to problems of injustice. By comparison, the Biden administration
has appealed to “core values and beliefs” that Americans share to condemn forcefully hate,
white supremacy, racism, sexism, and xenophobia; both President Biden and Vice President
Harris have not been afraid to recognize the problem of systemic racism and have called for a
government-wide commitment to racial equity.64
Linda C. McClain
Robert Kent Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
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